This PR hardens artifact URL signing by encoding signature inputs in an
unambiguous binary payload before computing the HMAC.
What it changes:
- replace direct concatenation-style signing inputs with explicit
payload builders
- encode string fields with a length prefix before appending their bytes
- encode integer fields as fixed-width binary values instead of decimal
text
- apply the same hardening to both:
- Actions Artifact V4 signing in `routers/api/actions/artifactsv4.go`
- artifact download signing in `routers/api/v1/repo/action.go`
- add regression tests that verify distinct field combinations produce
distinct payloads and signatures
Why:
The previous signing logic built HMAC inputs by appending multiple
fields without a strongly structured representation. That kind of
construction can create ambiguity at field boundaries, where different
parameter combinations may serialize into the same byte stream for
signing.
This change removes that ambiguity by constructing a deterministic
payload format with explicit boundaries between fields.
Backport #37707
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
backport #37118
This PR closes remaining `public-only` token gaps in the API by making
the restriction apply consistently across repository, organization,
activity, notification, and authenticated `/api/v1/user/...` routes.
Previously, `public-only` tokens were still able to:
- receive private results from some list/search/self endpoints,
- access repository data through ID-based lookups,
- and reach several authenticated self routes that should remain
unavailable for public-only access.
This change treats `public-only` as a cross-cutting visibility boundary:
- list/search endpoints now filter private resources consistently,
- repository lookups enforce the same restriction even when addressed
indirectly,
- and self routes that inherently expose or mutate private account state
now reject `public-only` tokens.
---
Generated by a coding agent with Codex 5.2
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #37704
This PR hardens OAuth token exchange validation by binding exchanged
credentials to the client and redirect URI that originally obtained
them.
What it changes:
- reject refresh token exchanges when the refresh token belongs to a
different OAuth application
- reject authorization code exchanges when the `redirect_uri` in the
token request differs from the `redirect_uri` stored with the
authorization code
- add integration coverage for:
- authorization code exchange with a mismatched redirect URI
- refresh token reuse across two different dynamically created OAuth
applications
Why:
OAuth authorization codes and refresh tokens must remain bound to the
client context that originally received them. Without those checks:
- a valid authorization code can be redeemed against a different
registered redirect URI of the same client
- a refresh token can be replayed by a different OAuth client
---------
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #37706
This PR tightens several OAuth validation paths related to PKCE
handling, redirect URI normalization, and refresh-token replay safety.
What it changes:
- switch redirect URI comparison to ASCII-only normalization for
exact-match checks, avoiding Unicode case-folding surprises
- harden PKCE verification by:
- allowing PKCE omission only when no challenge data was stored
- rejecting exchanges with a missing verifier when PKCE was used
- rejecting malformed challenge state where a challenge exists without a
valid method
- comparing derived challenges with constant-time string matching
- make refresh-token invalidation counter updates conditional on the
previously observed counter value, so stale refresh state cannot be
accepted after the grant changes
Why:
These checks close gaps where:
- redirect URI comparisons could rely on broader Unicode normalization
than intended
- malformed or incomplete PKCE state could be treated too permissively
- concurrent or stale refresh-token use could advance the same grant
more than once
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Backport #37695 by @lunny
This PR fixes two permission-checking gaps in Git and LFS request
handling.
## What it changes
- keep wiki Git HTTP pushes on the normal write-permission path, even
when proc-receive support is enabled
- revalidate LFS bearer token requests against the current user state
and current repository permissions before allowing access
- add regression coverage for unauthorized wiki HTTP pushes
- add LFS tests for blocked users, revoked repository access, read-only
upload attempts, and valid write access
## Why
- wiki repositories should not inherit the relaxed refs/for handling
used for normal code repositories
- LFS authorization tokens should not remain usable after a user is
disabled or loses repository access
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Backport of #37662.
---
This PR was written with the help of Claude Opus 4.7
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lunny Xiao